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Abstract 
As a result of technical development and globalisation, investing abroad has become much more 
accessible, and thus capable of facilitating the transference of wealth and income to offshore locations 
with the aim of evading tax obligations at home. In this regard, the Automatic Exchange of Information 
(AEOI) across countries is an important weapon in the fight to undermine cross-border tax evasion. 
This is why, in 2014, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched 
its proposal for a global AEOI standard, the so-called Common Reporting Standard (CRS). This article 
provides a cross-country analysis of the national CRS laws for a sample of 41 countries with the aim of 
determining whether significant deviations from the original OECD Model might hinder the 
effectiveness of the AEOI. The authors’ key recommendation to the OECD and all participating 
jurisdictions is to achieve a higher level of standardisation when designing the CRS locally. 
Furthermore, international pressure on the US to join the CRS is needed. A global AEOI system can 
contribute substantially to the fight against cross-border tax evasion only if all attractive locations for 
illicit financial flows are eliminated.  
JEL Classification: F42, G21, H26, H31  
Keywords: Automatic Exchange of Information, Tax Evasion, Offshore Locations, Common 
Reporting Standard 
1. Introduction
Globalisation has made it easier for taxpayers to make and manage their investments through offshore 
financial institutions. Thus, over a time span of several decades, a significant offshore wealth 
management industry has developed in several financial centres around the world, such as, Bermuda, 
the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong and Switzerland. For example, evidence suggests that 8 per cent of the 
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world’s household financial wealth is held offshore, corresponding to 10 per cent of the global gross 
domestic product (GDP).1 Some financial flows towards the jurisdictions referred to above are based on 
legitimate motives, such as currency diversification or hedging against political risk. Some financial 
flows may, however, be driven by individuals seeking to hide their wealth and related income while 
failing to comply with tax obligations at home. Although it is hard to quantify the overall size of the 
revenue loss from cross-border tax evasion, it is generally considered to be substantial. For example, a 
2008 US Senate staff report indicates that at least US$100 billion of tax revenue is lost every year due 
to “offshore tax abuse”.2 
In this regard, the general consensus points towards the AEOI across jurisdictions as being the most 
powerful policy tool available to fight such tax evasion.3 The US was the first country to take positive 
action towards developing a system for the AEOI in tax matters. Indeed, in 2010 the US Government 
passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) with the specific aim of fighting the 
increasing tax revenue loss resulting from financial outflows to offshore locations without appropriate 
taxation at home. Following the implementation of FATCA, the rest of the world began to show an 
increasing interest in following the US’s example. It was in this context that, early in 2013, the G20 
made a formal request to the OECD to develop a global standard for the AEOI.4 As the next step, the 
OECD presented its proposal for the CRS and, by the end of 2013, the G20 leaders had fully accepted 
this standard. A consideration of the CRS reveals that it is strongly based on FATCA but that there are 
certain important differences between the two. In addition to technical variances at the level of 
enforcement and in relation to the definition of “reportable person”, under the CRS, participating 
jurisdictions accept that they will need to request that local financial institutions collect foreign account 
information and agree to transmit such data automatically to the relevant foreign tax authorities. This is 
not the case under FATCA where the US imposes substantial penalties on financial institutions around 
the world if they are unwilling to automatically transmit financial account information on US citizens 
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) either directly (Model 2 or no model intergovernmental 
agreement) or indirectly via the local competent authority (Model 1 intergovernmental agreement). 
In this article, the authors focus specifically on the CRS and analyse its implementation at national level 
in 41 countries around the world, including the EU and OECD Member States and a representative 
sample of offshore locations. As at December 2017, there were more than 2,600 bilateral relationships 
worldwide based on the OECD Model for the AEOI. This leads to the expectation that tax evasion based 
on shifting wealth and related income offshore will experience a significant drop. In this context, a 
survey undertaken by Deutsche Bank and Oliver Wyman predicted a US$1.1 trillion outflow from 
offshore accounts as a reaction to the implementation of an AEOI system by 53 jurisdictions by the end 
                                                 
1 For more details, see G. Zucman, “The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. Net Debtors or 
Net Creditors?” (2013) 128(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1321, 1322.  
2 Estimates are from US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax 
Compliance (2008), available at: http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/071708PSIReport.pdf [Accessed 
15 April 2019]. 
3 This is supported by the related literature suggesting that engaging in information exchange does affect cross-
border tax evasion. Both in the context of debt and equity portfolio investment (e.g. M. Hanlon, E.L. Maydew, 
and J.R. Thornock, “Taking the Long Way Home: U.S. Tax Evasion and Offshore Investments in U.S. Equity 
and Debt Markets” (2015) 70 The Journal of Finance 257; L. De Simone, R. Lester and K. Markle, 
Transparency and Tax Evasion: Evidence from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) (2019) 
Working Paper, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No.17-62) as well as bank de-
posits (e.g. N. Johannesen and G. Zucman, “The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven 
Crackdown” (2014) 6(1) American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 65; L. Menkhoff and J. Miethe, Dirty 
Money Coming Home: Capital Flows into and Out of Tax Havens (2017) Discussion Paper No.1711 DIW 
Berlin). 
4 For a comprehensive overview on the OECD Model for the AEOI, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Ex-
change of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters, 2nd edn (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264267992-en [Accessed 17 April 2019].  
  
of 2017.5 Although the estimations referred to above seem encouraging, the OECD continues to work 
constantly to improve its global standard on the AEOI in tax matters.  
This article attempts to support the OECD by monitoring and recommending revisions to how the CRS 
has been implemented in domestic laws. The article contributes to the literature by providing a detailed 
description of the steps necessary to implement the CRS followed by a cross-country analysis of 
domestic CRS regulations. In particular, the authors consider eight different aspects of the CRS in 
respect of which any key deviation from the original OECD Model for the AEOI might hinder 
significantly its effectiveness in reducing cross-border tax evasion. The categories mentioned above 
include the implementation status at national level of current CRS law, the timing of the entry into force 
of that law, the chosen legal form, the enforcement level, the inclusion of a wider approach, the 
development of a prescribed self-certification form, the selected reporting schema and the data retention 
requirement. Finally, based on such a global comparison, the goal of this article is to provide valuable 
recommendations to both the OECD and all current and future participating jurisdictions on possible 
improvements to the CRS. In this way, the authors aim to support the development of a global standard 
for the AEOI, which can provide a strong contribution to the fight against cross-border tax evasion.  
Furthermore, this article provides a detailed analysis of how global initiatives on information exchange 
are translated into national laws. In this regard, the authors provide an evaluation framework for future 
related research. In particular, the authors go beyond the key features which have so far been considered 
as hindering the efficiency of the AEOI policy tool (that is, the country coverage and the scope of the 
requested data). This is done by highlighting the relevance of the selected legal approach, the 
enforcement level, the format for both the collected and the transmitted information and the data 
retention period. Thus, the authors believe that researchers in the field will be able to profit from this 
study by also considering the aspects listed above when testing empirically the effect of initiatives in 
the field of information exchange on cross-border tax evasion. 
The rest of the article is organised as follows: section 2 presents the institutional background by 
analysing the most important regulations which target cross-border tax evasion specifically; section 3 
offers a detailed description of the crucial steps to be taken when implementing the CRS locally from a 
governmental and financial institution perspective; section 4 provides the cross-country study on 
national CRS legislations; section 5 gives key graphical evidence on the development of cross-border 
tax evasion in recent years; section 6 concludes by proposing the authors’ main recommendations on 
how to improve current CRS regulations.  
 
2. AEOI: from evolution to revolution 
The initial steps towards a global standard for the AEOI 
To all intents and meaningful purposes, 1998 represents the beginning of the path towards enhanced 
global tax transparency. Back then, the OECD issued the well-known report on harmful tax 
competition,6 in which key policy tools to fight tax evasion based on shifting wealth and related income 
to low tax countries, mainly tax havens, were presented. Among these tools, a special emphasis was 
placed on the necessity of reaching an enhanced level of international tax transparency through the 
AEOI. 
In this regard, the US was the first jurisdiction to take the initial step towards a standard for the AEOI. 
In 2001, the Qualified Intermediary (QI) Program was launched by the IRS with the aim of collecting 
tax on US source income from assets held overseas. The QI Program offers Foreign Financial 
Institutions (FFIs) the possibility of enjoying simplified information reporting for their non-US account 
holders and access to reduced withholding tax rates for payments made to clients in exchange for the 
                                                 
5 Estimates are taken from K. Lakhani, M. O-Connor, S. Andrews, B. Bedell, A.-A Singh, Deutsche Bank and 
Oliver Wyman, Special Report: Time to Advance and Defend (2017), available at: 
http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/v2/publications/2017/jun/Global-Wealth-Management-
OW.PDF [Accessed 15 April 2019]. 
6 OECD, Harmful tax competition. An Emerging Global Issue (Paris: OECD, 1998). 
  
collection and remittance of tax on US-sourced income earned by their clients. More specifically, 
financial intermediaries entering the QI Program (via an agreement with the IRS) are requested to 
properly identify and collect specific documentation on their clients in order for payments to receive 
reduced withholding rates.7  
A few years later, the EU began to respond to the fight against cross-border tax evasion. Back in 2003, 
the EU was the first to develop a multinational AEOI programme through Council Directive 2003/48/EC 
on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (also known as EU Savings Directive) 
(Council Directive 2003/48/EC).8 The Directive targeted interest income underreported by EU residents. 
In particular, participating countries were given the option to either exchange bank account information 
on foreign EU residents or to levy a withholding tax on interest income owned by each reportable 
individual. However, Council Directive 2003/48/EC was still very limited in terms of country coverage 
and scope, that is, it only focused on income from private savings and excluded corporate accounts. In 
2015, it was repealed due to the overlap with Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 
amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field 
of taxation, which introduced the CRS at EU level.9 
 
The introduction of FATCA 
In 2007, the IRS issued its report entitled Reducing the Federal Tax Gap,10 which estimated a total 
annual tax gap of approximately US$197 billion and for the portion for which the IRS was unable to 
collect any information, about 64 per cent was lost due to presumed cross-border tax evasion. At the 
same time, the UBS tax scandal11 highlighted the weaknesses of the QI Program. In this regard, evidence 
emerged of UBS assisting US tax residents in evading taxes by offering offshore banking services 
designed specifically to avoid identification, reporting and withholding under the QI regime. In 
particular, a former UBS investment banker informed the IRS of how UBS had helped several US 
taxpayers to avoid domestic tax obligations by opening offshore accounts.12 
The US Government reacted to its citizens’ increasing concerns about cross-border tax evasion by 
passing FATCA in March 2010. The aim was to fight offshore tax evasion and other similar forms of 
illicit tax behaviour by ensuring the collection of information from FFIs on US tax residents’ assets held 
abroad, as well as the related income generated from these assets. In particular, under FATCA, FFIs are 
expected to conduct due diligence on existing accounts as well as to develop processes to identify new 
accounts which are directly or indirectly held by US clients. The data to be collected is both on domestic-
source and on foreign-source payments received on those accounts. A 30 per cent withholding on each 
US source payment is imposed on non-FATCA compliant FFIs or non-compliant accounts (excluding 
those in Model 1 jurisdictions).13 When considering the reporting process, FFIs may directly transmit 
the collected data on the US clients to the IRS. Alternatively, Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) 
may be signed whereby jurisdictions might, for example, implement FATCA into national law and 
                                                 
7 For more details on the scope and aim of the QI program, see IRS, Revenue procedure 2000-12 (24 January 
2000). The most recent QI Agreement aligns the regime with FATCA through IRS, Revenue procedure 2017-15 
(01.01.2017). 
8 For more details, see the European Council, Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments [2003] OJ L157/38. 
9 For more details, see European Council, Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending 
Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation [2014] OJ 
L359/1. 
10 Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Reducing the Federal Tax Gap: A Report on Im-
proving Voluntary Compliance (2007). 
11 For more details, see S. Hansard, “UBS fined $780 million in tax evasion scandal”, InvestmentNews, 19 Feb-
ruary 2009. 
12 United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs, Tax Haven Banks and U. S. Tax Compliance (2008). 
13 A summary of key FATCA provisions, IRS, Summary of Key FATCA Provisions (page last reviewed or up-
dated 29 March 2019), is available at: https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/summary-of-key-fatca-provi-
sions [Accessed 15 April 2019]. 
  
information requested from the US tax authorities is exchanged on the basis of the bilateral Model 1 
IGA.14 In this case, FFIs transmit the requested financial information on US citizens to the respective 
local tax authorities, which then forward it to the IRS. Finally, jurisdictions may have a Model 2 IGA15 
where a bilateral agreement to support FATCA is established but FFIs must report directly to the IRS. 
Currently, 113 IGAs (either under Model 1 or Model 2) introducing FATCA regulations locally have 
been signed.16 
 
The introduction of the CRS 
The substantial costs involved in establishing the infrastructures needed to ensure FATCA compliance 
created, back in 2012, an increasing interest on a worldwide scale in developing a global standard for 
the AEOI. It should have been as similar as possible to FATCA but should also have enabled the 
collection and the exchange of financial account information on a wider range of foreign account holders 
than those owned only by US tax residents. In 2013, the first discussion around the development of a 
global standard for the AEOI began, and, one year later, the OECD issued the final version of its Model 
for the AEOI in the form of the CRS. Table 1 below presents a detailed outline of key CRS events.17  
 
Table 1: timeline of key CRS events 
2013 
 9 April 2013: G20 endorsement of automatic exchange as the expected new global standard.  
 18 June 2013: the OECD Model for a global AEOI system is presented to the G8 Summit.  
 5–6 September 2013: the G20 leaders fully endorsed the OECD proposal for a global model 
of AEOI. 
2014 
 13 February 2014: the CAA and the CRS are officially published and approved by the 
OECD.  
 23 February 2014: G20 endorsement of the CRS Model.  
 6 May 2014: more than 60 jurisdictions publicly support the CRS via a joint statement at 
the OECD Council meeting. 
 29 October 2014: signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) 
in Berlin at the 7th Global Forum. 
2015 
 The set of countries, which decided to exchange information through the CRS system in 
September 2017 for the first time, the so-called 1st wave adopters, implemented the CRS 
into their national laws. 
2016 
 1 January 2016: financial institutions located in early-adopters’ countries start collecting 
information on new foreign reportable accounts for the purpose of the CRS. 
 31 December 2016: financial institutions start reviewing high value pre-existing reportable 
accounts, that is, those above US$1m. 
2017 
 September 2017: the first exchange of information among early-adopters’ countries begun. 
                                                 
14 For the complete Model, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Resource Center, Model 1A IGA Reciprocal, 
Preexisting TIEA or DTC (30 November 2014), available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-pol-
icy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Reciprocal-Model-1A-Agreement-Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC-11-30-14.pdf 
[Accessed 24 April 2019]. 
15 For the complete Model, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Resource Center, Model 2 IGA, Preexisting 
TIEA or DTC (30 November 2014), available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/trea-
ties/Documents/FATCA-Model-2-Agreement-Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC-11-30-14.pdf [Accessed 24 April 2019]. 
16 A complete list of IGAs (both Model 1 and Model 2), is available at U.S. Department of the Treasury, Re-
source Center: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx [Accessed 15 
April 2019]. 
17 For a complete overview of key CRS events, see OECD, Automatic Exchange Portal, “Tax–Automatic Ex-
change of Information”, available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/ [Accessed 15 April 2019]. 
  
 31 December 2017: financial institutions start reviewing low value pre-existing reportable 
accounts and entity accounts. 
 
The OECD Model for AEOI represents the bilateral or multilateral duty of signing governments to 
translate the CRS into domestic law, to ensure the establishment of a suitable IT system to collect and 
exchange the information on foreign account holders with the respective jurisdictions and to guarantee 
adequate protection of the exchanged data. The standard consists of four fundamental components as 
described in Figure 1: the Competent Authority Agreement (CAA); the Common Reporting Standard 
(CRS); the Commentaries on the CAA and the CRS; and the CRS XML Schema. 
Figure 1: OECD Model for AEOI: key components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First of all, the CAA component18 enables the implementation of a CRS system into national law by 
setting its legal basis. Three different CAA models exist: the multilateral model (or MCAA, to be used 
jointly with the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters19); the bilateral and 
reciprocal model (to be used in combination with Article 26 of the OECD Model Double Tax 
Agreement20); and the non-reciprocal model (to be used in the absence of income tax in the respective 
jurisdiction). Secondly, the CRS component21 provides the due diligence and reporting regulations 
which financial institutions must follow in order to collect and transfer the required financial information 
to their respective tax authorities. Finally, the CRS XML Schema22 is a reporting schema in extensible 
mark-up language (XML) elaborated upon by the OECD for the purposes of exchanging the information 
across jurisdictions as well as to receive information from the jurisdictions’ financial institutions in a 
standardised manner. 
                                                 
18 For the official model for the CAA, see OECD, Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic 
Exchange of Financial Account Information, available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-infor-
mation/multilateral-competent-authority-agreement.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2019]. 
19 OECD, The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters; Amended by the 2010 Protocol 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011). 
20 OECD, Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Its Commentary (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012). 
21 For a detailed overview on the OECD guidelines on the CRS, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Information in Tax Matters, Implementation Handbook, 2nd edn (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018), 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/implementation-handbook-standard-for-
automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-in-tax-matters.htm [Accessed 17 April 2019]. 
22 For more information on the OECD guidelines on the CRS XML Schema, OECD, Standard for Automatic Ex-
change of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters, above fn.4, Annex 3, 230–290.  
The Competent  
Authority 
Agreement (CAA) 
The legal basis for 
the CRS at 
national level 
The Common 
Reporting 
Standard (CRS) 
The due diligence 
and reporting 
regulations for the 
AEOI 
The Commentaries 
on the CAA and 
the CRS 
Additional 
guidelines on the 
CAA and the CRS 
 
The CRS XML 
Schema 
The reporting 
schema in 
extensible mark-up 
language (XML) 
OECD Model for 
AEOI 
  
As at October 2018, a total of 107 countries have committed to implementing the CRS by signing the 
MCAA.23 Of these countries, as at 7 August 2018, 103 have signed the MCAA.24 The majority of these 
jurisdictions already have CRS national laws with an intended first information exchange date of 
September 2017 for 1st wave countries and September 2018 for 2nd wave countries. Furthermore, the 
most recent list also includes jurisdictions undertaking the first exchange by 2019–2020—3rd and 4th 
wave countries. All major tax havens are on the list which implies a substantial change in the field of 
bank secrecy.25 Although in the last decade several offshore locations have already set up a sound 
network of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), the CRS is substantially different from 
traditional TIEAs and this should ensure that it has a stronger impact on tax evasion based on parking 
income and wealth offshore.  
In particular, the CRS requires financial institutions to automatically exchange detailed financial account 
information on non-resident taxpayers if the agreement on the AEOI on tax matters between their 
jurisdiction and the client’s resident jurisdiction is in place. In contrast, traditional TIEAs are typically 
based on exchanging information upon request. What is more, participating jurisdictions do not have to 
sign agreements on an individual country-by-country basis. If they opt to sign the MCAA at the OECD 
level and they implement a CRS system into their national law, they automatically agree to exchange 
information on foreign financial accounts with any other jurisdiction that has signed the MCAA and has 
a CRS system in place.26 
Given the global scope of the CRS, co-operation, consistency and persistence among participating 
jurisdictions are required in order to achieve a well-functioning AEOI system. The OECD recognised 
that the CRS can deliver benefits only if there is an international level playing field in relation to both 
its widespread adoption and the effectiveness of its implementation.27 In this respect, the OECD’s Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes has provided significant support. 
For example, it offered extensive implementation assistance, such as, information and guidance on the 
CRS.28 In addition, it provides technical assistance in the form of training seminars to government 
officials and one-on-one advisory services and support to developing countries through pilot projects.29 
Furthermore, on 9 March 2018, the OECD released Model Mandatory Disclosure Rules for CRS 
                                                 
23 For the complete list of jurisdictions, which have committed to the CRS so far, see OECD, AEOI: status of 
commitments (October 2018), available at: https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf 
[Accessed 15 April 2019]. 
24 For a complete list of jurisdictions, which have signed the MCAA and the respective date of signature, see 
OECD, Signatories of the multilateral competent authority agreement on automatic exchange of financial 
account information and intended first information exchange date (status as of 29 October 2018), available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/MCAA-Signatories.pdf 
[Accessed 15 April 2019]. 
25 For a comprehensive definition of tax haven, see G. Schjelderup, “Secrecy Jurisdictions” (2016) 23(1) 
International Tax and Public Finance 168. For a list of offshore locations, see J.R. Hines Jr and E.M. Rice, 
“Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business” (1994) 109(1) The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 149. The list of offshore locations, which signed the MCAA, includes among others the Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, Hong Kong, the Isle of Man, Panama and Singapore.  
26 Alternatively, although less preferable, jurisdictions can still decide to sign a CAA and exchange information 
automatically on a bilateral basis. In this case, similarly to TIEAs, individual agreements with jurisdictions 
around the world have to be put in place in order to establish an exchange relationship. 
27 For more details, see OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
Automatic exchange of information implementation report 2017 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), 3. 
28 The OECD provides extensive guidance on what the CRS is and how it can be correctly implemented through 
its CRS Implementation Handbook (see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in 
Tax Matters, Implementation Handbook, above fn.21) and its CRS-Related Frequently Asked Questions (Febru-
ary 2019), available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/CRS-related-
FAQs.pdf [Accessed 24 April 2019]. Moreover, a dedicated TIN (Taxpayer Identification Number) Information 
Help Desk has been set up, see OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes - Technical Assistance - Help Desk, available at: http://www.oecd.org/ [Accessed 15 April 2019]. 
29 For a complete overview of the OECD technical assistance program, see OECD, Global Forum on Transpar-
ency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes - Technical Assistance, above fn.28. 
  
Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures.30 The purpose of these rules is to assist tax 
administrations with information on arrangements that (purport to) circumvent the CRS (or CRS 
Avoidance Arrangements) and on structures that disguise the beneficial owners of assets held offshore 
(Opaque Offshore Structures). Nevertheless, given the magnitude of this challenging task, there is still 
“room for improvement” in the interests of achieving the originally stated purpose and objective of the 
AEOI: substantially reducing tax evasion based on re-locating wealth and related income offshore. The 
aim of this article is to support the OECD in this ambitious project. This is done in section 4 by analysing 
current CRS national laws in 41 different countries around the world and, based on this analysis, the 
authors make suggestions for potential improvements in order to achieve a well-functioning system for 
the AEOI. Before entering into the details of CRS national laws, in the next section, a detailed 
examination of the concrete steps which are needed to be taken in order to put local CRS systems into 
place is provided, with a focus on the perspective of governments and of financial institutions. 
 
3. Different perspectives on CRS implementation  
The government perspective 
As mentioned in the previous section, signing the CAA is the starting point for establishing a CRS 
system at national level, either on a bilateral or a multilateral basis. Currently, over 100 jurisdictions 
have signed the CAA and most of them chose a multilateral approach. Signatory jurisdictions agree to 
exchange the required financial information with each other automatically and the CAA sets out which 
information must be exchanged as well as the timing and the method of exchange. Finally, the CAA 
also establishes the provisions on guaranteeing the confidentiality and the safeguarding of the data, on 
the process of monitoring the smooth operation of the agreement and on the procedure for any potential 
future amendment to it.  
Once the CAA is signed, countries can start designing the legislation required to implement the CRS 
domestically. The OECD provides detailed guidelines31 on key CRS features but countries have 
flexibility in relation to certain aspects of the standard. First of all, the CRS component provides a clear 
definition of “reportable financial institutions” and a detailed list of non-reportable financial institutions. 
In particular, only entities (corporations, partnerships, trusts and foundations) and not sole proprietors 
are considered to be reportable financial institutions. Additionally, within entities, non-reportable 
financial institutions include governmental entities and their pension funds, international organisations, 
central banks, certain retirement funds, qualified credit card issuers, exempt collective investment 
vehicles, trustee documented trusts and other low-risk financial institutions. The latter category is a 
residual category which gives single jurisdictions the opportunity to add financial institutions which are 
not explicitly listed as non-reportable entities but which are still in line with the requirements under 
section VIII(B)(1)(c) of the CRS and the associated commentary to be considered low risk.32  
Moreover, the CRS component provides a list of financial accounts to be reviewed during the due 
diligence procedures such as depository accounts, custodial accounts, equity and debt interest accounts, 
cash value insurance contracts and annuity contracts as well as a list of excluded accounts.33 The latter 
includes retirement and pension accounts, non-retirement tax favoured accounts, term-life insurance 
contracts, estate accounts, escrow accounts, depository accounts due to non-returned overpayments and 
other low-risk accounts. However, according to section VIII(C)(17)(g) of the OECD guidelines on the 
CRS, in this case jurisdictions are also granted the option to create a specific national list of excluded 
accounts if such accounts present a low risk of being used for tax evasion, show features which are 
                                                 
30 OECD, Model Mandatory Disclosure Rules for CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Struc-
tures (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018).  
31 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21. 
32 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21, 57–61. 
33 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21, 62–71. 
  
significantly similar to one of the categories of excluded accounts described in section VIII(C)(17)(a) 
through to (f) of the OECD guidelines on the CRS and do not frustrate the purposes of the CRS.  
Furthermore, CRS national laws need to provide clear requirements in relation to the definition of 
reportable persons. Under the OECD guidelines on the CRS, reportable persons are account holders 
being resident in a reportable jurisdiction for tax purposes, that is, a jurisdiction where an automatic 
exchange of information agreement is in place. Account holders are considered to be reportable persons 
unless they belong to the category “active non-financial entity”, that is, a publicly listed corporation or 
related entities of such a corporation, a governmental entity, an international organisation, a central bank 
or a financial institution and not an entity whose primary activity is receiving passive income.34  
Finally, when designing the CRS law at a national level, the OECD guidelines on the CRS provide no 
specific information on the enforcement level. Thus, countries need to decide on how enforcement will 
be supervised, and the level of penalties for non-compliant institutions or reportable persons which can 
be in the form of fixed monetary amounts and could be imposed daily or annual as well as per non-
compliant account or per non-compliant financial institution. Additionally, certain countries opted for 
imposing criminal prosecutions for non-compliance with the CRS.  
The last step to be taken when setting up a functioning CRS system is the establishment of the IT 
infrastructure for collecting information provided by reportable financial institutions, transmitting such 
information to the respective foreign tax authorities and analysing the received financial data on the 
respective tax residents. First of all, tax authorities of participating jurisdictions must create the IT 
framework to collect the account data from financial institutions. If within the CRS national law, a self-
certification form is not provided or is provided but its use is not mandatory, a further step is needed, 
namely the reformatting of the financial data to be exchanged under the CRS. Furthermore, participating 
governments are required to set up a dedicated online portal where financial institutions can submit the 
information on reportable foreign account holders required under the CRS. This process necessitates the 
development of highly protected transmission channels and protocols, via encryption or physical 
measures or both. The minimum standard set up within the OECD guidelines on the CRS needs to be 
fulfilled. Secondly, tax authorities of participating jurisdictions have to develop the IT infrastructure to 
collect all of the required account data on their own residents from counterparties around the world. The 
first necessary step is to ensure the operational security for maintaining the received personal and 
financial information. According to the OECD guidelines on the CRS, the minimum safety level would 
be one which is consistent with best practice standards such as the latest ISO 27000 Series Information 
Security Standards.35 What is more, a process for data validation is required in order to monitor whether 
the transmitted information is relevant (that is, that the data on an account holder has been correctly sent 
to the account holder’s country of residence) and whether it has been conveyed in a complete format 
(that is, mandatory information is fully provided). 
 
The financial institution perspective 
On the basis of the OECD’s MCAA, and more notably, the Standard for AEOI in Tax Matters (including 
commentaries),36 global financial institutions already had the framework of what could be expected to 
be contained within the national legislation of the respective countries around the world. At this point, 
project teams within financial institutions, many of which were still in the process of implementing 
FATCA within their respective institutions, were now required to take on the task of “translating” these 
components, including various hypotheses on what the national CRS legislation would contain, into 
operational activities for assessing the impact of the CRS on their organisations, and then, rather quickly 
                                                 
34 If the reportable person is a passive non-financial entity, then the related financial institution is required to 
identify its controlling person(s) and report the financial account information of such a passive non-financial en-
tity only if it belongs to a reportable person(s).  
35 For more details, see The ISO 27000 Directory, An Introduction to ISO 27001, ISO 27002….ISO 27008, avail-
able at: http://www.27000.org [Accessed 24 April 2019]. 
36 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters, above fn.4. 
  
thereafter, to begin implementing the required changes.37 All the while, these teams were, and still are, 
responsible for tracking changes in national law and responding accordingly to ensure compliance with 
the requirements. For larger, global institutions, the foregoing has resulted in the commitment of 
thousands of days for internal employees and the expenditure of millions of US dollars in external 
specialist support to complement these teams and fill the existing knowledge gaps. 
In order to provide a foundation for gauging the impact and the scope of the CRS in each jurisdiction, 
CRS project teams were first of all required to understand the potential legal entities and arrangements 
(including certain structured products) which would be impacted by the CRS. Given the lack of available 
national legislation at the time, and the heterogeneous rules around the world, the analysis of legal 
entities needed to be carried out at the national level, as opposed to centrally (for example, regionally or 
globally). This created significant inefficiencies and resulted in the need for focused, co-ordinated 
efforts to ensure that the existing legal entities, in some cases numbering tens of thousands, were: 1. all 
captured within a central legal entity management system (or some combination of systems); 2. 
appropriately reviewed on the basis of currently available information in order to make initial 
classifications; 3. reviewed again in the case of newly released or revised CRS national guidance; and, 
4. definitively classified for CRS purposes. These efforts would determine the scope of those areas 
within the organisations which had been impacted and represent a task the importance and difficulty in 
execution of which should not be underestimated.  
Additionally, the process outlined above focused only on existing entities. However, these requirements 
would need to be applied on a daily basis in the legal entity management function in order to ensure that 
newly created entities and arrangements were also considered in addition to those which were being 
liquidated. All the while, stringent consideration needed to be given to national data protection and data 
privacy rules for all aspects of these activities. This approach would require that specialists with both a 
deep understanding of local CRS definitions and the ability to collect the data necessary to understand 
the structure and activity of each legal entity in order to apply the rules in determining the appropriate 
classification were available and assigned in each participating jurisdiction. The classification of each 
legal entity and arrangement, as described above, would prove to be a critical element in the 
determination of the applicable compliance requirements. 
In a similar manner, these institutions were required once again to review their products and accounts, 
as they had done only a few years (or even months) earlier for FATCA purposes, to determine which of 
these would: 1. be considered financial accounts for purposes of the CRS; and 2. then identify which of 
those would be reportable. Issues similar to those which related to the legal entity analysis arose as a 
result of divergent national legislation requiring accounts to be reviewed based on the legislation, if 
available, of the jurisdiction in which the accounts were maintained. In addition, given the fact that 
countries continue to sign the MCAA, the national lists of reportable jurisdictions must be reviewed 
regularly and incorporated into this process to ensure appropriate reporting of account holders.  
Finally, as with the legal entity analysis, the review of existing account holders is only one component 
of this exercise. The account opening process needed to be amended, including on-boarding forms on a 
jurisdictional basis and, since the reporting schemas are divergent in many jurisdictions, reportable 
financial institutions needed to ensure that all information required for reporting was also collected at 
some point throughout the process. Since some jurisdictions required specified self-certification forms 
to be used by financial institutions in their jurisdiction, this further limited the ability to implement a 
common, global on-boarding and due diligence process. In addition, because some countries did not 
allow for the so-called wider approach, on-boarding forms needed to be reviewed and updated constantly 
to include new signatories to the MCAA. This is an obvious inefficiency resulting from the fact that 
organisations should not collect information from account holders from non-signatory countries without 
the expressed consent of their local authorities, given generally in the form of permission to apply the 
wider approach.  
                                                 
37 For a detailed overview of the implications of the CRS for financial institutions and taxpayers, see K. 
Kuepper, “Germany: FATCA 2.0: The Introduction of a Global Standard on Automatic Exchange of Tax Infor-
mation”, International Tax Review, 17 June 2014. 
  
Further, due to data privacy and data protection concerns, organisations needed to ensure that the data 
collected was required in order to make a CRS determination and was not superfluous to these needs. 
Throughout this entire process, impacting tens of millions of accounts in some cases, clear 
communication with account holders was essential, in particular in relation to the collection of required 
information from existing customers. As a result of traditionally poor response rates of under 20 per 
cent to such requests, contingency plans and subsequent actions needed to be implemented to ensure 
that account activity was interrupted until all required documentation was provided for the purposes of 
enabling the institution in question to make its account classifications. Clearly, impacted account holders 
did not welcome such activities. 
The activities described above, in addition to many others, are carried out with the objective of 
identifying reportable accounts and, ultimately, reporting financial account information on those account 
holders properly to the local tax authorities. Again, given the lack of a standard reporting schema, or the 
opportunity to default to the OECD’s CRS schema in all jurisdictions, global institutions face the 
seemingly unnecessary burden of including many variables in their reporting mechanisms. Initially, the 
common approach was to create a master file of all applicable data elements from all jurisdictions in 
which the institution operates and to require the data collection (that is, self-certification and on-
boarding forms) in each jurisdiction. However, this approach was quickly abandoned because of data 
protection and data privacy concerns. Therefore, institutions now face the task of constantly tracking 
developments within the reporting schemas on a country-by-country basis and incorporating any 
changes in their internal reporting mechanism for CRS purposes. Remember though, if a data element 
is required to be reported to the tax authorities, then, from an operational perspective, this data element 
must first be collected from the impacted account holders, thereby running changes through all of the 
revised processes. In order to manage reporting to the local tax authorities, although the more practical 
approach would appear to be a global, centralised mechanism, this is often unfeasible given the 
challenges of local schemas, data privacy and data security. 
Finally, the objective of the CRS is, generally, to share the financial account information of a country’s 
residents with that country, but the effectiveness of the legislation will, nevertheless, be directly related 
to each government’s ability to ensure that its financial institutions are meeting the requirements of the 
CRS legislation. Although many jurisdictions do not require the implementation of a specific 
compliance programme, given the certifications made by the financial institution (and potentially by 
individual employees) for CRS purposes, the lack of an explicit requirement for a compliance 
programme does not mean that such programmes are not being implemented. Financial institutions are 
creating the appropriate internal control environment and tailored compliance programmes for CRS 
processes. These programmes go under scrutiny on a regular basis in order to give the relevant 
compliance officers both the assurances they need to file CRS reports confidently and the comfort that, 
under inspection by the competent tax authority, material findings would not exist. Depending on the 
size of the institution and the structure of its operations, individuals or entire teams may be obliged to 
manage these compliance processes on a full time basis. 
 
4. Qualitative analysis: cross-country overview of CRS national laws 
In this section, a detailed cross-country analysis of national CRS legislation for a selected sample of 
countries is provided.38 Indeed, when looking at the OECD Model for the AEOI, it can be seen that it is 
a template based on the US FATCA Model 1 IGA which provides that single jurisdictions have some 
degree of flexibility in certain areas in relation to how such a system has to be implemented domestically. 
However, the effectiveness of the CRS in fighting cross-border tax evasion based on residency may be 
hindered if strong deviations from the original OECD Model exist when it is implemented into national 
law.  
                                                 
38 For a complete list of the countries considered in the sample, see Appendix, Table 1a. 
  
In the following cross-country analysis, the CRS laws in OECD and EU Member States39 are compared 
to those laws which exist in a set of commonly considered offshore locations (the Bahamas (BS), 
Bahrain (BH), Bermuda (BM), the Cayman Islands (KY), Guernsey (GG), Hong Kong (HK), the Isle of 
Man (IM), Jersey (JE), Macau (MO) and Singapore (SG)).40 Dividing the authors’ country sample into 
OECD and EU Member States versus offshore locations is especially relevant given the heterogeneity 
in the CRS system implementation status and the core CRS features across those subsets of jurisdictions. 
In this way, they represent the ideal scenario for an international comparison of the effective execution 
of the CRS at domestic level.  
The authors focus upon several dimensions in their cross-country study. These dimensions have been 
carefully selected as those influencing the effective execution of the CRS in fighting cross-border tax 
evasion. In particular, the analysis considers the legislative status, the legislative approach, the 
enforcement level, the scope of the standard, the reporting requirements and the data retention 
requirements. In contrast, potential deviations from the proposed OECD list of non-reportable financial 
institutions are not considered. More specifically, certain countries do present deviations from the 
OECD related classification. However, additional categories of financial institutions falling outside the 
scope of the CRS are typically identified to avoid the duplicative reporting of the same financial account. 
Moreover, the OECD aims to monitor participating countries constantly in order to ensure that national 
CRS legislation does not exclude certain low risk financial institutions, which may be used to circumvent 
the application of the CRS.41 Additionally, jurisdictions have the chance to add local categories to the 
official list of excluded accounts provided under the OECD guidelines on the CRS if such accounts 
present a low risk of being used for tax evasion. When considering the selected sample of countries, the 
authors did analyse potential deviations. Nevertheless, the detected local categories of excluded accounts 
do not present features that could seriously frustrate the purpose of the CRS by creating space for non-
detection of illicit wealth and related income outside the country of residence.42 Since the authors do not 
regard deviations in the category of non-reportable financial institutions and excluded accounts as 
seriously harming the effectiveness of the CRS, those categories were not considered in their cross-
country analysis. 
For the purposes of this article, all information on CRS national laws has been collected making use of 
the PwC Customer and Investor Tax Transparency Compare Tool (CITT Compare Tool).43 The CITT 
Compare Tool is an online platform used to manage global tax information exchange requirements 
(including FATCA, UK Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories (CDOT) and CRS). 
Additionally, local experts in CRS legislation within the PwC Network have reviewed and provided 
                                                 
39 OECD and EU Member States as of June 2018. Excluding Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Malta, Norway and Portugal. For those countries information on CRS national legislation is not available 
through the PwC CITT tool. 
40 With respect to offshore locations, the authors selected these according to the category list provided by the 
Bank for International Settlement, Locational Banking Statistics (BIS LBS) (complete database available at: 
https://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm [Accessed 24 April 2019]), in Table A3 (available at: 
https://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/a3?m=S [Accessed 24 April 2019]) since the database provided by this insti-
tution is the one commonly used in the literature on tax evasion (e.g. H. Huizinga and G. Nicodème, “Are 
International Deposits Tax-Driven” (2004) 88(6) Journal of Public Economics 1093; Johannesen and Zucman, 
above fn.3; A. Alstadsæter, N. Johannesen and G. Zucman, “Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro 
Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality” (2018) 162 Journal of Public Economics 89). 
41 In this regard, Hong Kong initially classified Occupational Retirement Schemes (ORS) as non-reportable fi-
nancial institutions. However, several reports were sent to the OECD on its online disclosure facility signaling 
the risk of shifting income to accounts in ORS as a way for tax evaders to avoid being reported to tax authorities 
under CRS. Following international pressure Hong Kong issued strict guidance highlighting that only a specific 
type of ORS could be considered to be a non-reportable financial institution. 
42 For example, except for the Isle of Man, which adds specific retirement, depository and dormant accounts, all 
other considered offshore locations follow the OECD list of excluded accounts strictly. 
43 A full description of the tool is available at K. Küpper and M.D. Orlic, PwC’s Customer & Investor Tax 
Transparency (CITT) Compare Tool (November 2015), available at: 
https://blogs.pwc.de/citt/files/2015/12/CITT-Compare-Tool-Flyer-November_2015.pdf [Accessed 24 April 
2019].  
  
feedback on the considered jurisdictions in the authors’ analysis.44 The following sub-sections provide 
a detailed discussion of the categories listed above identifying links to the national CRS law in the 
selected sample of 41 countries. Moreover, key recommendations on best practice examples are 
suggested for each investigated aspect of national CRS laws. 
 
 
The legislative status 
When looking at the CRS implementation at national level, heterogeneity can be seen to exist in the 
current legislative status as shown in Figure 2. First, all the selected EU Member States belong to the 
so-called 1st wave, that is, those jurisdictions that performed the first exchange of information in 2017. 
This homogeneity in CRS legislative status results from Directive 2014/107/EU,45 which provides the 
foundation for implementing the CRS at EU level. Most of the remaining OECD Member States are 2nd 
wave countries, that is, they began exchanging information in 2018. Israel is the only OECD Member 
State which has committed to the CRS but has not yet implemented the standard in its national 
legislation.46 
Figure 2: the CRS status 
                                                 
44 Feedback from local PwC contacts in Bahrain and Bermuda has not been collected. For those countries, the 
information from PwC’s CITT tool was complemented by looking directly at the CRS national law and CRS na-
tional guidelines. 
45 For more details, see European Council, above fn.9. 
46 However, draft legislation exists and should be voted on soon. For more details, see PwC CITT Blog, M.D. 
Orlic, Israel issues Draft CRS Regulation (11 August 2017), available at: https://blogs.pwc.de/citt/ [Accessed 17 
April 2019]. 
  
 
Finally, the US as the world’s major economy has shown no sign of commitment to the CRS.47 One 
reason for this can be seen in the unattractiveness of the CRS from a US perspective. Indeed, information 
on US tax citizens holding financial accounts abroad is already collected through FATCA. In addition, 
US financial institutions would face substantial additional costs if they were to implement the CRS 
locally given that they are not domestically affected by FATCA in the same way as non-US financial 
institutions. Lastly, the IRS would have to establish a system for collecting and exchanging substantial 
information on foreign financial account holders in US financial institutions. Under FATCA, data from 
US financial institutions on foreign accounts is not automatically exchanged with other jurisdictions 
                                                 
47 In fact, it has demonstrated no intention to join this global initiative. For more details, see Editorial Board, 
“The U.S. Is Becoming the World’s New Tax Haven”, Bloomberg, 28 December 2017. 
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across the world. Only information on direct owners48 and the related interest earned is provided on 
request based on FATCA Model 1A IGA.49 
When turning to the selected group of offshore locations, a promising CRS implementation status seems 
to have been achieved. Indeed, most of these offshore locations belong to the 1st wave adopters. This 
means that they had implemented the CRS into national law by the end of 2015 and that the first 
information exchange had already occurred in 2017. Only a minor group of offshore locations (the 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Hong Kong and Singapore) belongs to the 2nd wave of adopters, that is, they 
implemented the CRS locally in late 2016 and exchanged information in 2018, for the first time. Macau 
is the only offshore location, which has committed itself to the CRS but did not implement it at national 
level. Nevertheless, it does appear that in Macau progress is being made to implement the CRS locally.50 
By considering the cross-country analysis of the CRS’s legislative status as presented above, it is 
possible to state that the initial objective of reaching a global standard for the AEOI has been 
substantially achieved. Not only the OECD countries, but also almost all offshore locations, have 
adopted the CRS in their national law. The few remaining jurisdictions have at least committed to it and 
are taking important steps to implement the CRS in local law. Unfortunately, the most significant 
economy in the world, the US, has not shown any interest in joining the CRS project. Data from US 
financial institutions on foreign accounts as well as the related beneficial owners are not automatically 
exchanged with other jurisdictions across the world. Moreover, even the reciprocity, which is dictated 
by the Model 1A IGA, does not appear to be respected in its entirety by the US. Indeed, the US does not 
seem to provide other jurisdictions with information on or content concerning foreign account holders 
despite receiving substantially similar information from those other jurisdictions on its own citizens and 
tax residents.51 It is not surprising then to note that the US has been indicated as being one of the safest 
locations to which to re-allocate wealth and related income upon the first CRS implementation date.52 
Some financial flows are certainly based on legitimate motives (for example, seeking business 
opportunities) but to a reasonable observer most of these flows would appear to have suspicious timing 
and motives. This is in line with the related literature suggesting that as long as attractive locations for 
cross-border taxation evasion exist, tax evaders will find it more beneficial to relocate their wealth and 
                                                 
48 In May 2016, under the Bank Secrecy Act – CDD Rule (see Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, CDD 
Rule (11 May 2016), available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-11/pdf/2016-10567.pdf 
[Accessed 24 April 2019]), the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued a new customer due 
diligence requirement imposing on certain domestic financial institutions the collection of a beneficial ownership 
information form for their respective clients’ corporations and trusts. However, the law has not yet being en-
acted. Additionally, even if enacted, anecdotal evidence suggests that it would not be effective because among 
others it allows senior managers of the company to be classified as beneficial owner, see Tax Justice Network, 
Financial Secrecy Index - Narrative Report on USA (2018), available at: 
http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/USA.pdf [Accessed 17 April 2019]. 
49 For a detailed description of key differences between FATCA and CRS reporting requirements, see P.A. Co-
torceanu, “Hiding in plain sight: how non-US persons can legally avoid reporting under both FATCA and 
GATCA” (2015) 21(10) Trust and Trustees 1. 
50 In May 2017, the legislative assembly in Macau enacted a new legal framework for the exchange of infor-
mation in order to align the country with G20 and EU standards. One year later, Macau prepared to sign the Mul-
tilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information. For more 
details, see PwC CITT Blog, M.D. Orlic, Macau prepared to sign the Multilateral Competent Authority Agree-
ment on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information (11 May 2018), available at: 
https://blogs.pwc.de/citt/ [Accessed 17 April 2019]. 
51 For example, between 2014 and 2015 the German tax authority provided the IRS with information on more 
than 301,000 US taxpayers having income generated in Germany but received almost no information on German 
taxpayers generating income in the US, as reported by C. Gammelin, “Einbahnstraße in die USA”, Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung, 3 April 2018.  
52 Indeed according to The Economist, the US is currently not providing information to most of the non-EU 
countries around the world, making it a very attractive location for hiding wealth and related income for the pur-
pose of tax evasion (from Financial Transparency, “The Biggest Loophole of All”, The Economist, 20 February 
2016).  
  
related income to non-collaborative jurisdictions rather than repatriate it.53 Thus, in order to fight tax 
evasion based on shifting wealth and related income to offshore locations effectively, a truly worldwide 
coverage as regards CRS adoption needs to be achieved. 
  
The legislative approach 
Although under the OECD Model for the AEOI, a multilateral and bilateral approach is allowed, almost 
all jurisdictions which have committed to the CRS so far have agreed to implement it under a multilateral 
approach as depicted in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: the legal form 
 
When considering Macau, the local government has only recently signed the MCAA but has not yet 
started implementing it in its national law. Hong Kong has just signed the MCAA but implemented the 
CRS originally on a bilateral basis. This implies that, currently, financial data on foreign accounts is 
exchanged exclusively with counterparties with whom Hong Kong has signed a TIEA. Originally, only 
Japan and the UK established exchange relations with Hong Kong based on the CRS but the Hong Kong 
Government announced in early 2017 its plan to expand the country list to 72 new bilateral exchange 
agreements.54 Hong Kong’s decision to extend the country coverage was motivated mainly by the risk 
of being labeled as a non-cooperative jurisdiction on tax transparency matters by the EU and the 
OECD.55 Moreover, the Government in Hong Kong realised the non-feasibility of a bilateral approach. 
Signing exchange agreements on a country-by-country basis is extremely complex. This is especially 
                                                 
53 Johannesen and Zucman, above fn.3; P. Caruana-Galizia and M. Caruana-Galizia, “Offshore Financial 
Activity and Tax Policy: Evidence from a Leaked Data Set” (2016) 36(3) Journal of Public Policy 457; De 
Simone, Lester, and Markle, above fn.3. 
54 From the Inland Revenue Department, Amendment Ordinance No.2, Inland Revenue (Amendment) (no. 2) Or-
dinance 2017 (15 June 2017). 
55 Indeed as reported by Baker McKenzie, being part of such a list implies not only potentially remarkable repu-
tational damage but also the risk of concrete counter-measures by international organisations, making the coun-
try a less attractive location for foreign direct investment and for conducting business locally (R.L. Weisman and 
S.R. Sieker, Hong Kong Government Considers Expanding Its List of ‘Reportable Jurisdictions’ for Automatic 
Exchange of Information (9 March 2017), available at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexol-
ogy.com/fd32698b-5e65-4e3a-9375-32d317bed2c4.pdf [Accessed 24 April 2019]). 
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relevant in light of the continuing expansion in the scope and country coverage of the international 
network for the AEOI, which increases the number of TIEAs which Hong Kong would have to make.56 
The drawbacks of a bilateral approach as described above encouraged the Government in Hong Kong 
to issue an amendment Bill in October 2017 with the aim of preparing the route for Hong Kong’s 
participation in the MCAA, which it has now implemented.57 Initially, the Bahamas were also more 
inclined to implement a CRS system under a bilateral approach but, also in this case, international 
pressure pushed the change towards a multilateral approach.  
Moreover, certain jurisdictions, that is, the Isle of Man, Singapore and Switzerland, have a mixed system 
where for a certain subset of countries only a bilateral approach applies. For example, Switzerland has 
implemented agreements with EU Member States on a multilateral basis and with jurisdictions outside 
the EU on a bilateral basis.58 However, having a mixed approach also hinders the effectiveness of the 
CRS in fighting cross-border tax evasion. Thus, only a pure multilateral approach to the CRS ensures 
the creation of a sound network of exchange relations. By signing the MCAA, jurisdictions 
automatically agree to exchange information on foreign financial accounts with any other jurisdictions 
that have a CRS system in place. This reduces the risk that certain jurisdictions where substantial wealth 
and related income are located for tax evasion purposes are establishing bilateral relationships with only 
a limited number of countries. If this were to happen, the CRS would not reach its primary objective of 
combating illicit financial flows to offshore locations. On this critical aspect, the OECD has achieved 
impressive results. As at June 2018, a total of 100 jurisdictions across the world had signed the MCAA, 
which ensures the implementation of the CRS at national level on a multilateral basis. Thanks to this 
far-reaching achievement, a network of more than 2,600 bilateral exchange relationships is currently in 
place and guarantees extensive scrutiny of foreign financial accounts worldwide. However, a fully 
effective CRS system would require the adoption of the multilateral approach by each current, and 
future, participating jurisdiction. 
 
The enforcement level 
According to the original OECD Model for the AEOI, enforcement and oversight is decided locally. 
Each jurisdiction has the power to set the monetary penalty for financial institutions as well as for 
account holders in cases of missing or incorrect information transmission or failure to conduct the 
required due diligence and compliance process. In addition to monetary consequences, countries may 
use criminal prosecution. When looking at the sample of selected jurisdictions, a significant variation 
can be found, as shown in Figure 4 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 For more details on the reasons for the Hong Kong Government to amend the CRS law, see Hong Kong Gov-
ernment, press release, Inland Revenue Ordinance to Be Amended to Facilitate International Tax Co-Operation 
(6 October 2017), available at: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/today.htm  [Accessed 17 April 2019]. 
57 From the Inland Revenue Department, Amendment Ordinance No.5, Inland Revenue (Amendment) (no. 2) Or-
dinance 2017 (6 October 2017). 
58 For a complete list of bilateral treaties that Switzerland has for the purpose of the AEOI under the CRS, see 
State Secretariat for International Financial Matters, Automatic Exchange of Information - Financial Accounts, 
available at: https://www.sif.admin.ch/sif/en/home/multilateral/steuer_informationsaust/automatischer-infor-
mationsaustausch/automatischer-informationsaustausch1.html [Accessed 24 April 2019]. 
  
Figure 4: the penalties (* criminal penalties) 
 
In terms of monetary penalties, values range from US$762 to around US$2.5 billion. For the purpose of 
this comparison, the authors converted the maximum possible amount from local currency to US dollars 
and an infringement on a hypothetical total volume of 100,000 accounts per financial institution for a 
prolonged period of 30 days. Indeed, differences in enforcement levels across countries are not limited 
to the top threshold of monetary punishment. Certain jurisdictions such as Ireland or the Isle of Man 
may apply daily penalties while others, such as Belgium, France, Mexico, the Netherlands and Turkey, 
charge a fixed monetary penalty on each single account. When comparing the enforcement level, several 
countries in the authors’ sample charge monetary penalties below the US$100,000 thresholds. The latter 
group includes five offshore locations, that is, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Jersey, and 
Singapore. Yet, some of those offshore locations may impose criminal prosecution.59 
In general, for those jurisdictions which charge monetary penalties of less than US$100,000 and which 
do not impose criminal prosecution, it is questionable whether local financial institutions would perceive 
the cost of CRS compliance to be higher than the penalties for non-compliance. Certainly, the 
implementation of the CRS system implies substantial costs for the financial institutions. For example, 
Finér and Tokola (2017) provide some initial estimates ranging from more than US$100 million in terms 
of information technology (IT) systems and from US$8 to 800 million in terms of the start-up costs per 
affected individual institution worldwide.60 Therefore, imposing limited penalties of less than 
US$100,000 for non-compliance with the CRS may create incentives for financial institutions to not 
report clients’ data for purposes of the AEOI. In contrast, the FATCA charges 30 per cent withholding 
on each US source payment for non-compliant financial institutions, which creates a much higher 
pressure to comply with the requirements.  
                                                 
59 It is important to note that the CRS law in Guernsey has not set a specific maximum penalty amount but may 
charge officers of non-compliant financial institutions with imprisonment. In particular, the law states: “An RFI 
which without reasonable excuse fails to comply with any provision of paragraph (1) or Schedule 2 is guilty of 
an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, to a fine not 
exceeding twice level 5 on the uniform scale, or to both”, from the Treasury and Resources Department of 
Guernsey, Regulation No.97 of December 1, 2015—The Income Tax (Approved International Agreements) (Im-
plementation) (Common Reporting Standard) Regulations. 
60 For more details, see L. Finér and A. Tokola, “The Revolution in Automatic Exchange of Information: How is 
Information Used and What Are the Effects? (2017) 71(12) Bulletin for International Taxation 688. 
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However, seeking uniform enforcement mechanisms in the context of the OECD Model for the AEOI 
across more than 100 nations may turn out to be impossible. Nonetheless, the OECD could try to set a 
minimum level of monetary penalties to be imposed on non-compliant financial institutions and could 
also suggest tax evasion standards (or separate prosecution) for non-compliant account holders. In this 
way, an acceptable level of enforcement would be encouraged. Moreover, the authors propose, in 
addition to the monetary punishment, a revocation (even provisional) of a licence to operate in cases of 
non-compliance with the CRS requirements. This type of enforcement already exists in China for 
example. The authors believe that directly threatening the financial institution with the possible removal 
of its licence to operate represents a more effective warning when compared to threatening the 
institution’s employees with potential prison sentences.  
Finally, as regards cross-border tax evasion based on residency, the authors advise that jurisdictions 
should remove any kind of voluntary disclosure programme under which tax evaders could face reduced 
penalties for avoiding tax obligations at home in return for voluntary disclosure. Current evidence from 
the literature demonstrates that although such programmes offer a cheap solution in order to increase 
tax revenue, such programmes may also incentivise tax evasion.61 However, jurisdictions face 
substantial costs in relation to implementing the CRS locally, which, in turn, should ensure the effective 
monitoring of cross-border illicit financial flows. Thus, the authors see no substantial benefit in offering 
tax amnesties for past avoidance of tax obligations at home if the CRS is in place. The authors believe 
that the costs of maintaining a voluntary disclosure mechanism would be better invested in CRS 
oversight and governance. 
 
The scope of the CRS 
Under the CRS, individual jurisdictions have the opportunity to decide independently upon the adoption 
of a wider or a narrow approach. The narrow approach prescribes the reporting of information to 
financial institutions only on foreign financial accounts owned by residents in jurisdictions recognised 
as reportable jurisdictions. In contrast, under a wider approach financial institutions must (if the wider 
approach is mandatory) or can (if the wider approach is optional), collect information on all reportable 
foreign accounts even for account holders who are not residents of a reportable jurisdiction under the 
CRS. Figure 5 offers a cross-country overview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 Langenmayr (2017) provides an analytical model and tests it empirically in the context of the US voluntary 
disclosure programme. Overall evidence demonstrates that voluntary disclosure programmes do increase tax eva-
sion. However, the authors find that such programmes increase tax revenue net of the related costs (see D. 
Langenmayr, “Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?” 
(2017) 151 Journal of Public Economics 110).  Similar results are also found when analysing the general context 
of law violation. Marceau and Mongrain (2000) and Feess and Walzl (2005) offer evidence that reducing the 
penalty in cases of self-reporting increases the incidence of criminal actions (see N. Marceau and S. Mongrain, 
“Amnesties and Co-operation” (2000) 7(3) International Tax and Public Finance 259; E. Feess and M. Walzl, 
“Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values” (2005) 12(3) International Tax and 
Public Finance 265). 
 
 
  
Figure 5: the wider approach 
 
When considering the analysed sample of countries, only Hungary and Slovakia selected a narrow 
approach. This represents an extremely positive result. Indeed, in its guidelines on the CRS, the OECD 
invites governments to adopt a wider approach. The central reason for this is the inefficiency related to 
a narrow approach. First of all, the overall CRS implementation costs would be reduced by choosing a 
mandatory wider approach. Financial institutions would avoid additional due diligence processes to 
identify new reportable accounts whenever a new automatic exchange relationship is established. Thus, 
a wider approach would ensure that an existing national AEOI system could adapt quickly to a network 
of exchange relationships, which is currently constantly growing.  
Moreover, the OECD guidelines on the CRS provides no rules on the due diligence process for 
information on foreign financial accounts owned by residents of non-reportable jurisdictions.62 But, as 
the OECD suggests, another benefit of adopting a wider approach lies in the standardisation of the 
information collection for all foreign accounts.63 Of particular importance is the request for the collection 
of a TIN (Taxpayer Identification Number) for all new account holders if such an identification number 
is issued to the foreign account owner by its country of residence.64 Having the TIN readily available 
                                                 
62 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21, 23–26. 
63 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21, 23–26. 
64 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21, 25. 
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for all foreign account holders would not only ensure the immediate adaptation of the CRS national law 
to every new exchange relationship but would also enhance the efficiency of the AEOI system. It would 
reinforce the accuracy of all collected data on foreign account holders, especially if a reconciliation of 
the information on tax residence reported by the account holder is performed by tax authorities and 
financial institutions. 
Regardless of the clear benefits of the wider approach, some jurisdictions, including offshore locations 
such as the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong and Jersey, decided to make it optional. This allows each 
financial institution to decide independently whether to collect information on all foreign account 
holders immediately or rather only on those who are residents of reportable jurisdictions at the time of 
the due diligence process. This might be especially beneficial for financially constrained institutions, 
which would have the freedom to choose how much to invest for the purposes of the initial CRS 
implementation. In addition, confidence in an institution’s ability to maintain an ever-changing system 
is likely to be lower than it would be if it were maintaining a fixed system (with standardised processes).  
In summary, this option limits the flexibility of the CRS national laws in adapting easily to future 
changes and so this option could hinder the CRS’s effectiveness in tracking down wealth and related 
income located outside the residence country of the respective owner. Indeed, according to interviews 
with Swedish tax authorities conducted by Finér and Tokola (2017), the use of financial account data 
collected through AEOI relationships has been reduced due to the late arrival of such information from 
the counterpart jurisdictions.65 In this regard, the mandatory wider approach would guarantee the 
development of a uniform, yet flexible, CRS system, which could adapt easily to the growing network 
of exchange and offer a significant reduction in implementation costs. Thus, the mandatory wider 
approach is in the authors’ view the best solution.  
 
The reporting requirements 
By December 2017, more than 2,600 bilateral relationships for the AEOI had been established globally. 
Information on foreign financial accounts for CRS purposes had been collected by more than 250,000 
financial institutions around the world and exchanged across more than 50 jurisdictions.66 This implies 
that tax authorities in each of the 1st wave countries had received an incredible amount of data by 
September 2017. Manual analysis of this data would definitely not be feasible. Instead, local tax 
authorities scrutinise the collected information on foreign financial accounts through standardised 
processes. In particular, an electronic risk analysis is conducted by considering the overall account 
balance and whether or not there is a probability that sufficient evidence of tax evasion exists.67 Thus, 
the format in which the information is collected for the purpose of the CRS is crucial to ensuring its 
usability. In this regard, the homogeneity of the format under which information is collected and 
exchanged is critical for the safeguarding of data usability. For the purposes of national legislation 
implementing the CRS, the standardisation of two specific documents is of particular importance: the 
self-certification form and the reporting schema.  
 
The self-certification form 
First of all, any new client of a reportable financial institution is requested to provide a self-certification 
stating his/her country of residence. A self-certification form has been developed and made available on 
the OECD website68 but the use of this form is only encouraged and jurisdictions may decide to create 
                                                 
65 For more details, see Finér and Tokola, above fn.60. 
66 Estimates on financial institutions come from Finér and Tokola, above fn.60. While the total number of juris-
dictions are those listed as early adopters and thus exchanged information in September 2017 according to the 
OECD, AEOI: status of commitments (October 2018) above fn.23. 
67 Finér and Tokola, above fn.60.  
68 The OECD, via the OECD Automatic Exchange Portal—online support for the implementation of automatic 
exchange of information in tax matters,  provides a format both for individuals, Guidance for Financial Institu-
tions Requesting the Form (February 2016), available at: https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-
implementation-and-assistance/CRS_INDIVIDUAL_Self-Cert_Form.pdf [Accessed 24 April 2019], and for 
  
their own format or allow financial institutions to create their own. Indeed, the OECD only dictates that 
in order for the document to be valid, it must be signed (a positive confirmation may suffice as well) 
and that it must also include the date of signature, the name, the residence address, the residence 
jurisdiction(s), the TIN and the date of birth. Single jurisdictions might impose a specific self-
certification model and reportable account holders have to use it strictly for CRS reporting purposes. 
Alternatively, national CRS legislations may provide local guidelines and the financial sector can deliver 
a formal example of a self-certification format. In this case, reportable account holders can opt for such 
a format for CRS reporting purposes. When looking at national legislations implementing the CRS, 
differences emerge regarding the local guidelines for the self-certification format. These are depicted in 
Figure 6 below. 
Figure 6: the self-certification form 
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Most of the selected countries leave financial institutions and account holders free to choose the format 
for certifying their residence when opening a new account in a foreign country. However, such a decision 
may not be the best solution for achieving an efficient execution of the CRS at either a national level or 
an international level. First of all, this may create additional costs for the financial institutions. Financial 
institutions have to review all self-certification documents they collect from clients to assess their 
validity. Receiving standardised forms would significantly reduce the time spent on analysing such 
certificates of residency. This might be the reason why certain financial institutions provide a 
generalised self-certification format on their website and request each new client to specifically use it 
for the purpose of CRS reporting requirements.69 For global institutions, this is a critical issue and the 
standardisation of form content, or permitting institutions to default to a globally recognised standard, 
would be central to the efficient implementation and operation of the CRS. This would not result in the 
need to alter existing guidance and regulation significantly, but would rather allow for the use of a global 
standard. 
Moreover, any one country requiring a different standard will also cause significant inefficiencies for 
tax administrations as well. From the perspective of tax authorities the usability of such collected 
information is reduced substantially if clients have the chance to use any format they may prefer for 
certifying their residence. Additionally, if a standard format for the self-certification requirement is not 
used, tax authorities have to reformat the received financial data to be exchanged under the CRS. This 
                                                 
entities, Guidance for Financial Institutions Requesting the Form (February 2016), available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/CRS_ENTITIES_Self-
Cert_Form.pdf [Accessed 24 April 2019]. 
69An example of this is represented by the case of CITI Bank, where standard self-certification format is directly 
available on the bank’s website, see CITI Bank, Treasury and Trade Solutions, Common Reporting Standards, 
available at: https://www.citi.com/tts/solutions/liquidity-management/tax-regulations/crs/ [Accessed 24 April 
2019]. 
  
involves not only extra time spent on revising the information but also an additional financial burden in 
order to establish the IT infrastructure for reformatting the received data. Thus, governments should 
instead impose the OECD Model for self-certification requirements to ensure, through this 
standardisation, the highest quality and usability of the exchanged information under the CRS.  
 
The reporting schema 
The standardisation of the electronic reporting schema is also crucial in order to achieve an efficient 
CRS.70 In particular, a CRS XML Schema has been developed by the OECD for the purpose of both 
transmitting information to domestic tax authorities and exchanging such collected data across 
jurisdictions. This represents a standardised data structure for maintaining and transmitting information 
by electronic means and on a large-scale.71 The OECD provides detailed guidelines on how such a 
schema should look and how it can be implemented for the purpose of the CRS.72 Moreover, Directive 
2014/107/EU also prescribes the OECD Model.  
 
Figure 7: the reporting schema 
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As Figure 7 shows, the majority of the local governments opted for the OECD Model in their CRS 
national law either directly or through Directive 2014/107/EU. This means that more than half of the 
selected jurisdictions adopted the same standardised data structure for maintaining and exchanging 
information by electronic means. Twelve local governments, however, decided instead to issue national 
regulations on the electronic reporting schema for CRS purpose. This implies that although these 
governments generally still prescribe the same digital language, that is, XML, they opted to add specific 
domestic requirements.  
                                                 
70 This necessity is also expressed by the report on the implementation of the CRS in EU issued by the European 
Commission, see European Commission, First Report of the Commission AEFI expert group on the implementa-
tion of Directive 2014/107/EU for automatic exchange of financial account information (2015), available at: 
https://www.abbl.lu/content/uploads/2017/06/first-report-expert-group-automatic-exchange-financial-infor-
mation.pdf [Accessed 17 April 2019], 34–37. 
71 For detailed information on the CRS XML Schema, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Information in Tax Matters, Implementation Handbook, above fn.21, 50–51. 
72 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21, 49–52.  
  
Tailoring the reporting system to local requests might create substantial operational challenges for the 
financial sector. Indeed, the OECD XML has been developed to be as similar as possible to the FATCA 
counterpart. Additionally, in 2017, the IRS developed a new reporting schema (FATCA XML Schema 
v2.0) to more closely align to its CRS counterpart.73 Thus adopting the OECD XML Schema into CRS 
national laws reduces substantially the investment financial institutions, which are already FATCA 
compliant, have to make in order to establish the IT infrastructure for CRS purposes.  
Finally, tax administrators would also benefit from a standardised electronic language for exchanging 
information on financial accounts on a global scale.74 For example, when the German CRS regulation is 
considered, the guidelines for the reporting schema do prescribe the XML language but provide a 
different layout on how the data has to be transmitted compared to the layout suggested by the OECD.75 
In a world of standardised digital processes for the analysis of huge amounts of data, the existence of 
different reporting formats can seriously increase the risk of the non-usability of the received 
information on foreign financial accounts or greatly reduce efficiency in mining the data. This, once 
more, reduces the effectiveness of the CRS in identifying and investigating potential tax evaders.  
 
The data retention requirement 
The OECD does not impose a predefined required number of years for which financial institutions must 
retain information for the purpose of CRS requirements. Moreover, it provides only some limited 
guidelines on the minimum standards necessary to ensure the protection of such information.  Single 
jurisdictions have the chance to assess which retention period for the CRS would be most appropriate 
in case of future tax audits on foreign financial accounts and data safeguard obligations simply follow 
national privacy laws. The latter may vary substantially across countries. For example, jurisdictions in 
the EU have high standards of data protection especially thanks to the new regulation on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(Regulation 2016/679).76 However, other countries such as Chile, Japan and Mexico are not recognised 
by the European Commission as having regulations which guarantee an adequate security level in 
relation to personal data.77 Instead, when considering data retention periods for the selected sample of 
countries, several timeframes, ranging from five to 10 years, are defined under CRS national legislation. 
These are shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 For more details on FATCA XML Schema 2.0, see IRS, FATCA XML Schema v2.0 User Guide, available at: 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5124.pdf [Accessed 17 April 2019]. 
74 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21, 47. 
75 For a detailed overview of the German CRS XML Schema, see Bundeszentralamt für Steuern, Steuern Interna-
tional – CRS (1 June 2017), available at: https://www.bzst.de/DE/Home/home_node.html [Accessed 17 April 
2019]. 
76 For more details, see Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ 
L119/1. 
77 For more details, see European Commission, Adequacy Decisions - How the EU Determines if a non-EU 
Country Has an Adequate Level of Data Protection, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-
protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacy-protection-personal-data-non-eu-countries_en [Accessed 17 April 
2019]. 
  
Figure 8: the data retention requirement 
 
The lack of unique regulation in relation to the number of years for which data is required to be retained, 
as is the case in Switzerland, creates an additional cost for the financial industry. Indeed, this indicates 
that financial institutions have to review every single piece of domestic legislation carefully to find out 
the exact timing requirement. Moreover, financial institutions will need to monitor constantly whether 
every collected piece of information on all reportable foreign financial accounts is maintained for the 
requested period under each local regulation. At the same time, these institutions must ensure that the 
data is deleted or destroyed when the retention period has expired so as to fully protect their client’s data 
privacy. Additionally, the imposition of a very long time period for data retention may not represent the 
best solution because it may entail high costs in terms of cyber security. According to the national 
legislation of nine countries in the selected sample, financial institutions need to guarantee that all data 
collected on behalf of their clients is safely stored and to ensure that such a service is provided for 10 
years.  
The most important concern remains the heterogeneity of data retention requirements documented in 
the selected sample of countries. In terms of centralised, regional or global processes, these differences 
create a fundamental discrepancy and require local approaches. This is why the standardisation of data 
retention requirements would result in significant efficiencies and reduction of risks. Still, setting up 
globally unified data retention requirements is highly complex. For example, when considering 
Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision 
of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
(Directive 2006/24/EC),78 the missing harmonisation in terms of the required retention periods for data 
was one of the most unfavourable aspects of the Directive. Variations in domestic application of 
Directive 2006/24/EC created several challenges for telecommunications operations when developing 
the data storage system to ensure that it was fully compliant with such regulation.79 The European 
                                                 
78 For more details, see Council Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L105/54. 
79 Back then, the aim of the Directive was to establish duties for telecommunications providers on withholding 
the traffic and location data from clients to be used for investigation, detection and persecution of severe crime. 
However the affected industry was extremely critical of these new obligations not only because of the lack of 
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Commission acknowledged the issue described above and, in April 2014, the Directive was declared 
invalid.80 A new regulation, that is, Regulation 2016/679/EU,81 has been issued with the aim of not only 
guaranteeing a high level of data protection safeguards but also of harmonising data retention laws 
across the EU. This illustrates the complexity involved in achieving a common retention period. 
Nevertheless, the OECD should try to improve the current guidelines82 on data maintenance. The 
European Parliament and Council have already addressed this issue by sending a letter to the OECD 
asking for stringent guidelines on data retention and data protection in the context of the CRS.83  
The authors do believe that having the same standard data retention period across participating 
jurisdictions represents the most important way in which CRS compliance costs for reportable financial 
institutions can be reduced even at the price of imposing a long data retention period. Thus, the authors’ 
recommendation would be for governments to use a common standard, perhaps the OECD standard of 
a 10 year retention period for the purposes of CRS requirements. When formulating a homogenous value 
that could be the best solution for several jurisdictions, it is important to take the length of court 
processes into consideration. Requesting data only for five years may not be sufficient to ensure that 
information from non-CRS compliant persons can be analysed for the purposes of the final court 
decision. Knowing that countries will have different standards for tax purposes, these countries should 
create an exemption whereby CRS documentation would not be admissible as evidence in cases where 
the relevant statutory limitation period has expired but the institution is maintaining the data solely to 
comply with the CRS requirement. 
 
Interim conclusion  
The purpose of this section is first to offer a brief overview of main trends in CRS national laws and, 
secondly, to set out the authors’ key recommendations on how to improve the current system for the 
AEOI developed under the CRS. Table 2 provides a short summary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
harmonisation in respect of the data retention schema but also because of the substantial costs that woud be in-
curred in order to comply with the Directive. For more details, see European Commission, Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive 
(Directive 2006/24/EC) (Brussels: 18 April 2011, COM(2011) 225 final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trans-
parency/regdoc/rep/1/2011/EN/1-2011-225-EN-F1-1.Pdf [Accessed 17 April 2019], pp.27–32. 
80 For the complete statement, see Court of Justice of the European Union, press release, No.54/14, The Court of 
Justice declares the Data Retention Directive to be invalid (8 April 2014), available at: https://curia.eu-
ropa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-04/cp140054en.pdf [Accessed 17 April 2019]. 
81 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and re-
pealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1. 
82 For more details, see OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, 
Implementation Handbook, above fn.21. 
83 See letter of 12 December 2016 from the Chairwoman of the Art. 29 Working Party to the OECD, “OECD 
Common Reporting Standard”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=42942 [Ac-
cessed 17 April 2019].  
  
Table 2: country practice and key recommendations 
Legal Form  Currently bilateral and multilateral approaches are available. Almost all 
countries selected the multilateral approach. 
 The authors propose:  
– removal of the bilateral approach option; 
– set the multilateral approach as the only available option. 
Enforcement 
Level 
 Currently there is no strict OECD guideline on enforcement. Monetary 
penalties range from US$762 to around US$2.5 billion and some countries 
additionally prescribe criminal prosecution.  
 The authors propose: 
– set a minimum standard of monetary penalties;  
– prescribe the removal of the licence to operate; 
– eliminate voluntary disclosure programme (in the context of cross-
border tax evasion). 
CRS Scope  Currently possible to opt for a narrow approach or a (optional or mandatory) 
wider approach. Most countries selected a wider approach.  
 The authors propose: 
– removal of the narrow approach option; 
– set the mandatory wider approach as the only available option. 
Reporting 
Requirements  
 Currently it is possible either to opt for the standardised OECD Model or to 
impose a specific national model for the self-certification form and the 
reporting schema. Most countries do not prescribe a self-certification schema 
but select the OECD Model as the reporting schema. 
 The authors propose: 
– mandatory adoption of the OECD self-certification form and 
reporting schema or option for institutions to use it as an acceptable 
default globally;  
– removal of specific local requirements for self-certification form and 
reporting schema. 
Data Retention 
Period 
 Currently no strict OECD guideline on the required data retention period. 
Under national CRS law, the required data retention period typically ranges 
from five to 10 years.  
 The authors propose: 
– set a uniform maximum data retention period of 10 years, with 
caveats for conflicts where countries have shorter periods for other 
tax purposes. 
 
Overall, the CRS is already effective in almost all the selected countries in this article, with the exception 
of Israel, which is in the process of drafting the CRS law, Macau, which only recently signed the MCAA 
for the CRS, and the US, which shows no willingness to join the CRS project. When considering those 
jurisdictions that have already implemented the CRS into national law, most of these jurisdictions opted 
for a multilateral approach, although some have taken a mixed approach, that is, multilateral and bilateral 
at the same time. At the enforcement level, very heterogeneous penalty levels and forms for non-CRS 
compliance exist with several countries opting for what is, presumably, too low a monetary punishment, 
for example, less than US$100,000. Turning to the reporting requirements, most countries did not opt 
for a standardisation of the format for collecting and transmitting the financial account information. 
Typically, jurisdictions in the authors’ sample neither imposed a pre-defined self-certification form for 
collecting account holder information nor requested the use of the OECD Model for the reporting 
schema for transmitting the financial account data to foreign tax authorities. Finally, very heterogeneous 
data retention periods emerged when considering the authors’ sample of countries. These retention 
periods vary from five to 10 years and, in certain cases, no exact timeframe was even imposed for the 
purpose of CRS.  
  
When turning to the recommendations, first, the authors are of the opinion that the bilateral approach as 
an option should be removed. Specifically, even though it is understood that the bilateral approach was 
offered as an alternative when the CRS was initially launched, the authors believe that sustaining this 
option for the future, in a certain way, defeats the purpose of the CRS. This is because the bilateral 
approach offers jurisdictions the opportunity to decide on a country-by-country basis with whom they 
will exchange information. This could result in the CRS failing to fulfill its stated objective entirely, that 
is, failing to achieve a global reach. In addition, a multilateral approach significantly reduces the amount 
of time and financial costs with which jurisdictions have to deal when faced with the continuous 
expansion in the scope and country coverage of the CRS. 
Secondly, there should be a minimum standard for monetary penalties in cases of CRS non-compliance. 
Although participating jurisdictions are obliged to implement CRS effectively, the authors are of the 
view that a minimum monetary penalty standard set by the OECD would encourage an appropriate level 
of enforcement across countries. Moreover, in addition to the monetary punishment, the authors propose 
the introduction of another enforcement measure: the revocation of the licence to operate in the case of 
non-compliant financial institutions. Furthermore, for cases of cross-border tax evasion, the authors are 
of the opinion that any kind of voluntary disclosure programme should be revoked at this stage, because 
such programmes do not offer any kind of benefits for the CRS participating jurisdictions; on the 
contrary, they may incentivise tax evasion.84 
Thirdly, although the OECD already recommends the wider approach, the authors believe that it should 
be mandatory, instead of optional. Indeed, the wider approach ensures that financial institutions collect 
the information on all foreign account holders and not only on those residents in participating 
jurisdictions. Under the wider approach, financial institutions substantially reduce the future time and 
cost invested in adapting their internal process every time a new exchange relation under the CRS is 
established. Similarly, the wider approach would also facilitate the effective and timely adaptation of 
tax authorities’ internal systems to the continuously growing AEOI network. Thus, the authors suggest 
that any country, which would like to become MCAA signatory, must implement the mandatory wider 
approach into their CRS national law.  
Fourthly, the authors propose that participating jurisdictions be obliged to adopt a standardisation of the 
self-certification format and electronic reporting schema for the purposes of the CRS. In this regard, the 
OECD developed a model for the self-certification format as well as one for the CRS XML Schema. 
Both are publicly available on the OECD’s website. Imposing the OECD Model for the self-certification 
requirements and the CRS XML Schema would ensure a high level of readability of the collected 
information. Indeed, it is not the quantity, but rather the quality of the information exchanged under the 
CRS, which determines the effectiveness of such a global tax transparency tool in the fight against cross-
border tax evasion. The quality can be enhanced by ensuring homogeneity in both the format for 
collecting information on financial accounts and in the standardisation of the reporting schema for 
exchanging the data. Thus, the authors believe that participating jurisdictions should abstain from 
tailoring the CRS reporting schema to their specific local requirements and, instead, fully adopt the 
OECD self-certification Model and the OECD XML Schema. If the latter is not possible, participating 
jurisdictions should at least allow institutions to choose to submit the OECD standard schema.  
Lastly, the authors propose setting a standard in relation to the required retention period for CRS related 
data, as current inconsistent practice has the potential to create serious issues in the future. The authors 
are aware that requesting the storage of CRS data for long periods represents a significant cost for 
affected financial institutions. However, imposing very different data retention periods across countries 
constitutes the biggest source of costs. Thus, based on the sample of countries analysed for the purposes 
of this article, the authors propose the adoption of a uniform timeframe of 10 years as the required 
number of years for CRS data retention. The idea would be that the OECD publishes such a proposal 
and that governments should implement the requirement into CRS national laws thereafter. 
 
                                                 
84 For more details, see Langenmayr, above fn. 61; Marceau and Mongrain, above fn.61; Feess and Walzl 
(2005), above fn.61. 
  
5. Quantitative analysis: recent development in cross-country deposits 
The purpose of this section is to provide early evidence in relation to the development of cross-border 
tax evasion in the last decades, with the emphasis on key CRS events. This will enable the completion 
of the qualitative analysis of CRS national laws with preliminary evidence on the effect of the CRS on 
cross-border tax evasion. In this regard, cross-border deposits are selected since they are considered a 
sound proxy for measuring tax evasion.85 The data has been gathered from the Bank for International 
Settlements, Locational Banking Statistics (BIS LBS).86  
 
Figure 9: cross-border deposits held in banks located in offshore locations (in million US dollars) 
 
Data is from the BIS LBS—Table A587 and includes cross-border deposits held in banks located in the 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Hong Kong, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Ma-
cau and Singapore by foreign residents. They are divided into 1st wave countries or CRS 2017 (Ber-
muda, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man and Jersey), 2nd wave countries or CRS 2018 (the 
Bahamas, Bahrain and Singapore) and those not having CRS implemented or not having it effective 
(Hong Kong and Macau). 
Figure 9 depicts the development of cross-border deposits held in 10 offshore locations from 2000 to 
2017. The latter group of countries is the one used in the qualitative analysis in section 4. The overall 
trend shows that, starting from 2007, a drop in cross-border deposits has occurred for those jurisdictions 
belonging to the 1st and 2nd wave adopters. One reason for the detected decrease may be the improved 
global information exchange network.88 Indeed jurisdictions such as Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of 
                                                 
85 For example Johannesen and Zucman, above fn.3; Huizinga and Nicodème, above fn.40; Alstadsæter, 
Johannesen and Zucman, above fn.40. 
86 For the complete database, see BIS LBS, above fn.40. 
87 For example, for data on cross-border deposits held in banks located in the Bahamas, see BIS LBS, above 
fn.40, Table A5, available at: http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/A5?c=BS&p= [Accessed 24 April 2019]. 
88 For a detailed overview of TIEAs signed by tax havens during 2008 and 2011 as a reaction to international 
pressure, see K. Bilicka and C. Fuest, “With which Countries Do Tax Havens Share Information?” (2014) 21(2) 
International Tax and Public Finance 175.  
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Man signed several TIEAs between 2007 and 201189 whereas the Bahamas, Bermuda and the Cayman 
Islands followed in 2009–2011.90 The subsequent decrease in cross-border deposits in offshore locations 
that are 1st or 2nd wave adopters can be related to key CRS events such as the signature of the MCAA 
in late 2014. In contrast, the numbers for Macau or Hong Kong, which only recently signed the MCAA 
and either have not implemented the CRS yet or have implemented it initially under a bilateral approach, 
do not show a clear decrease from 2014 onwards. Thus, the current shift by Hong Kong away from a 
bilateral approach represents an important step towards the achievement of a truly global standard for 
the AEOI. 
In addition, the authors have analysed whether the common implementation of the CRS in multiple 
jurisdictions with the exception of the US led to an inflow of deposits located in the US. As there is no 
material automatic information exchange for foreign account holders in the US with their home 
countries, account holders might be incentivised to transfer their undeclared wealth and related income 
to the US. Figure 10 shows the outstanding volume of cross-border deposits located in US banks. 
As shown in Figure 10, upon the G20 endorsement of the CRS (5–6 September 2013),91 foreign wealth 
transfers to the US, measured in terms of cross-border deposits located in US banks, increased by around 
13 per cent and upon noting the effectiveness of the CRS in the 1st wave countries (1 January 2016) by 
7  per cent. This may suggest that upon the implementation of the CRS into national laws, the portion 
of deposits held in offshore locations for tax evasion purposes might have been reallocated, at least 
partially, to the US as the country may now appear to be an attractive location for hiding wealth and 
related income given its non-commitment to the CRS. 
Figure 10: cross-border deposits held in banks located in the US (in million US dollars) 
 
                                                 
89 In the period between 2007 and 2011 Guernsey signed 17, the Isle of Man 18 and Jersey 16 new TIEAs, see 
OECD, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm [Accessed 26 April 2019]. This represents a significant 
change in the tax transparency level in those offshore jurisdictions when considering that before 2007 they only 
had one, maximum two, TIEAs signed only with the US (Guernsey, the Isle of Man and Jersey) and the Nether-
lands (Guernsey and the Isle of Man). 
90 For example, in the period between 2009 and 2011 the Bahamas signed 25, Bermuda 23 seven and the Cay-
man Islands 18 new TIEAs, see OECD, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), above fn.89. This rep-
resents also in this case a significant change in the tax transparency level in those offshore jurisdictions when 
considering that before 2008 they only had one, maximum two, TIEAs signed only with the US (the Bahamas, 
the Cayman Islands), Australia (Bermuda) and the UK (Bermuda).  
91 For more details, see G20 Leaders’ Declaration, Saint Petersburg Summit (5–6 September 2013), available at: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html [Accessed 25 April 2019]. 
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Data is from the BIS LBS—Table A6.292 and includes loans and deposits held in US banks by residents 
of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Romania and the UK (these countries have been selected because they represent those EU and OECD 
Member States for which data is available in the BIS database). 
 
6. Conclusion  
A globalised world and increased number of cross-border activities have set a major challenge to 
jurisdictions and tax authorities worldwide, as they need to learn how to work together to make sure that 
the correct amount of tax is paid to the corresponding country. This is a challenge of the 21st century—
the era of technology and, as such, requires jurisdictions to be equipped with the appropriate legal, 
administrative and IT tools to be able to accomplish their goals, including the collection of taxes. With 
the development and adoption of the CRS, over 100 jurisdictions committed to automatically exchange 
information with each other. 100 countries have already signed the MCAA and undertook the first AEOI 
in 2017 followed by the second AEOI in September 2018. The success of this whole initiative by the 
OECD must be acknowledged. However, looking at how the CRS has been implemented currently at 
national level, the authors’ cross-country study of 41 jurisdictions has shown a significant variation in 
different aspects of the CRS national laws, which could be improved upon in future.  
Based on the analysis set out in this article, the authors have developed key suggestions for further 
enhancement. In particular, a key recommendation to the OECD and all current and future participating 
jurisdictions is to achieve a higher level of standardisation when implementing the CRS into national 
law. The authors are of the opinion that allowing flexibility in relation to the legal form and scope of the 
CRS may hinder its effectiveness in achieving the stated objectives. This is why it is suggested that the 
bilateral approach and narrow approach options be removed while the multilateral approach and the 
wider approach be imposed as the only available options for the CRS. Additionally, a high level of CRS 
compliance can be achieved through the imposition of a homogenous and sufficiently stringent 
enforcement level. In this regard, the authors advise the setting of a minimum standard for monetary 
penalties and the possibility of revoking the licence to operate for the non-complaint financial institution. 
Moreover, to achieve high quality as regards the information exchanged under the CRS, the adoption of 
the OECD Model for self-certification requirement and reporting schema and the avoidance of any 
national model is considered as being crucial. In addition, homogeneity needs to be achieved with regard 
to the maximum period for data retention requirement, which could be set to 10 years. 
The OECD has certainly set a level playing field for the global AEOI: 100 countries out of a total of 156 
existing countries have signed on to the CRS and the number is continuously growing. Nonetheless, one 
very important global player has not committed to the CRS, and has shown no interest in doing so in the 
future: the US. After FATCA has been enforced, US citizens and taxpayers have almost nowhere to hide 
their wealth. This is due to the fact that the IRS receives substantial identical information directly or 
indirectly from foreign financial institutions. Yet, despite its fairly aggressive approach to obtaining 
information on its citizens and taxpayers, the US is not providing the same level of information on 
foreign residents holding financial accounts in US institutions. Even the reciprocity clause under Model 
1 IGA is often seen to be violated as suggested by a report93 showing that the US is not actually “walking 
the talk”, as it is not exchanging the information on a mutual basis. Therefore, by neither reciprocating 
its request under FATCA nor signing the CRS, the US is on its way to turning into a very attractive 
offshore location for all non-US citizens and taxpayers. Having said that, the US currently has the status 
of the “weakest link” in the AEOI concept, that is, that no matter how much progress all CRS 
jurisdictions make, it is impossible to achieve the goal of the global AEOI unless the US joins.  
                                                 
92 For example, for data on Austrian residents holding bank accounts in US banks, see BIS LBS, above fn.40, 
Table A6.2, available at: http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/A6.2?c=AT&p= [Accessed 25 April 2019]. 
93 Gammelin, above fn.51. 
  
Finally, it can be concluded that adoption, implementation and execution of the CRS represents a major 
step forward and a significant weapon in fighting cross-border tax evasion. Continuous efforts for further 
improvements made by the OECD should be supported by countries, including the US, the professional 
community and the public. The authors hope that this article and the suggestions made therein will 
contribute to increasing the reach and achieving the greater potential of the CRS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix: Table 1a—cross-country overview of the main CRS features 
Countries 
 
CRS 
Status 
Enter 
into 
Force 
Legal 
Form 
Enforcement Level 
(* criminal penalties) 
Wider 
Approach 
Self-Cert. 
Form 
Reporting 
Schema 
Data 
Retention 
Requirement 
Australia E 2 M US$12,273,600 Y/M N OECD 5 
Austria E 1 M US$245,640 Y/O N OECD 7 
Bahamas E 2 M US$ 300,000 Y/M N OECD 5 
Bahrain E 2 M NYD Y/M N OECD 5 
Belgium E 1 M *US$245,640,000 Y Y/O NL 7 
Bermuda E 1 M *US$50,000 Y/M Y/O OECD NYD 
Bulgaria E 1 M US$15,733,750 Y/M Y/M OECD 5 
Canada E 2 M *US$31,850 Y/M Y/O NL 6 
Cayman 
Islands 
E 1 M US$60,975 Y/O Y/O OECD 6 
Chile E 2 M US$477,450 Y/M Y/O OECD 7 
Croatia E 1 M US$33,375 Y/M N OECD 10 
Cyprus E 1 M US$24,564 Y/M N OECD 6 
Czech Rep. E 1 M US$24,291 Y/O N OECD 10 
Denmark E 1 M NYD Y/M N OECD 5 
France E 1 M US$24,564,000 Y/M Y/O EU 5 
Germany E 1 M US$61,410 Y/M N NL 10 
Guernsey E 1 M *NYD Y/M Y/O OECD 6 
Hong Kong E 2 B/M *US$6,374 Y/O Y/O OECD 6 
Hungary E 1 M US$7,876 N N NL 8 
Ireland E 1 M US$116,796 Y/M Y/O EU 6 
Isle of Man E 1 B/M US$126,297 Y/M Y/M OECD 6 
Israel C 2 M NYD NYD NYD NYD NYD 
Italy E 1 M US$154,753 Y/M Y/O NL 10 
Japan E 2 M *US$4,647 Y/M N OECD 5 
Jersey E 1 M *US$4,210 Y/O N OECD 6 
Luxembourg E 1 M US$307,050 Y/M Y/O NL 10 
Macau C 2 M NYD NYD NYD NYD NYD 
Mexico E 1 M US$165,731,016 Y/O Y/O NL 5 
Netherlands E 1 M *US$2,548,515,000 Y/M Y/O NL 7 
New Zealand E 2 M *US$72,110 Y/M N OECD 7 
Poland E 1 M US$295,151 Y/M N NL 5 
Rep. of Korea E 1 M US$28,011 Y/M Y/M OECD 6 
  
 
Countries 
 The OECD as well as EU Member States are considered together with selected offshore locations 
(the Bahamas, Bermuda, Bahrain, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Hong Kong, 
Jersey, Macau and Singapore). 
 Certain OECD/EU members are missing. They are Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Norway and Portugal. Those countries are not available through the PwC CITT 
tool. 
 Information is taken from current national CRS regulations as of June 2018. Certain countries (for 
example, Austria) have draft amendments pending. The information contained in proposals that are 
in a draft phase is not considered. 
CRS status 
 E—effective, that is, financial institutions started collecting the foreign account holder information.  
 I—implemented, that is, the CRS system has been implemented under national law, but it is not yet 
effective (financial institutions did not start collecting the required information). 
 C—committed, that is, the country committed to CRS but still did not implement the law. 
 N—none, that is, the country did not commit to the CRS implementation. 
Enter into force 
 1—1st wave country, that is, a CRS system is in place since 1 January 2016 and information is 
exchanged in 2017. 
 2—2nd wave country, that is, a CRS system is in place at latest beginning of 2017 and will start 
exchanging information in 2018. 
 NYD—not yet defined, that is, the CRS law is still under the drafting process. 
Legal form 
 M—multilateral, that is, information is exchanged among all other jurisdictions where a CRS system 
is in place. 
 B—bilateral, that is, bilateral agreements have to be signed before information is exchanged among 
two jurisdictions if one has adopted a bilateral form. 
 NYD—not yet defined, that is, the CRS law is still under the drafting process. 
Enforcement level 
 Maximum monetary amount possible. 
 * is criminal prosecution is possible. 
 All amounts expressed in local currency are converted to US dollars (using the conversion rate from 
central bank websites on 23 April 2018). 
 To make the comparison possible, penalties are considered those applied in case of non-compliance 
for a total period of 30 days and for a total of 100,000 accounts per institution. 
Romania E 1 M US$1,629 Y/M Y/O NL 5 
Singapore E 2 B/M *US$762 Y/M N OECD 5 
Slovak Rep. E 1 M US$12,282 N N OECD 10 
Slovenia E 1 M US$30,705 Y/M Y/O EU 10 
Spain E 1 M US$24,564 Y/M N EU 10 
Sweden E 1 M NYD Y/M N EU 7 
Switzerland E 2 B/M US$256,568 Y/M Y/O OECD/NL ? 
Turkey E 2 M US$38,934,177 Y/O N NL 10 
UK E 1 M US$4,210 Y/M Y/O EU 6 
US 
N 
(FATCA) 
- - - - - - - 
  
 NYD—not yet defined, that is, the CRS law is still under the drafting process. 
Wider approach 
 Y/M—yes, mandatory, that is, financial institutions must collect information on every foreign 
account holder falling under the CRS definition of reportable account. 
 Y/O—yes, optional, that is, financial institutions have the option either to collect information on 
every foreign account holder falling under the CRS definition of reportable account or to collect only 
information for those foreign account holders who are resident of a country which has a CRS in place 
and thus with which the country of residence of the financial institutions has to exchange the 
information. 
 Y—yes, that is, not specified whether the wider approach is mandatory or optional. 
 N—no, that is, financial institutions must collect only the requested information for those foreign 
account holders who are resident of a country which has a CRS in place and thus with which the 
country of residence of the financial institution has to exchange the information. 
 NYD—not yet defined, that is, the CRS law is still under the drafting process. 
Self-certification form 
 Y/M—yes, a self-certification form is provided by the central government on its website and needs 
to be used for CRS purposes. 
 Y/O—yes, a self-certification form is provided by the central government or by financial institutions 
on their respective websites but its use for CRS purposes is optional. 
 N—no, that is, client has no template to follow when providing their personal information to the 
respective financial intuition. 
 NYD—not yet defined, that is, the CRS law is still under the drafting process. 
Report schema 
 OECD—OECD level, that is, the CRS schema provided in Annex 3 of the OECD Global Standard 
is used for purposes of exchanging the information. 
 EU—EU level, that is, the CRS schema provided under Article 9 of Directive 2003/48/EC guidelines 
is used for purposes of exchanging the information. 
 NL—national level, that is, the CRS schema provided under the CRS national law is used for 
purposes of exchanging the information. 
 NYD—not yet defined, that is, the CRS law is still under the drafting process. 
Data retention requirement  
 Maximum number of years, for which financial intuitions are requested to keep a copy of the 
collected data. 
 ?—no general rule is stated yet in the CRS law. 
 NYD—not yet defined, that is, the CRS law is still under the drafting process. 
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